From 237f60adf30e63409a463937b7b306a630d8bdc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: TheRON Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2025 15:54:05 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] Restructure --- .../Civic_Analysis_(Draft).md | 77 ------------------- 1 file changed, 77 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 docs/samples/DailyBrew__Missouri_Supermajority_2026/Civic_Analysis_(Draft).md diff --git a/docs/samples/DailyBrew__Missouri_Supermajority_2026/Civic_Analysis_(Draft).md b/docs/samples/DailyBrew__Missouri_Supermajority_2026/Civic_Analysis_(Draft).md deleted file mode 100644 index d1a312b..0000000 --- a/docs/samples/DailyBrew__Missouri_Supermajority_2026/Civic_Analysis_(Draft).md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,77 +0,0 @@ -Here’s a **CIVICVS-style draft** you can drop into your workspace. I’ve kept it lean and transcript-ready. - ---- - -# Civic Analysis (Draft): Missouri’s District-by-District Supermajority for Citizen Initiatives - -## Source - -Lara Bonatesta. *“Missouri voters to decide on 2026 measure to create a first-of-its-kind citizen initiative supermajority requirement.”* -**Ballotpedia, Daily Brew**, 18 September 2025. -[https://info.ballotpedia.org/dm?id=34D56BF65BDE86C99102C4F577E443A96E43630501AD63A4](https://info.ballotpedia.org/dm?id=34D56BF65BDE86C99102C4F577E443A96E43630501AD63A4) -(Local copy preserved as `DailyBrew__Missouri_Supermajority_2026.pdf`). -*Accessed 18 September 2025, 11:15 AM (CDT).* - ---- - -## Claim in the Record - -Missouri will place on the **Nov. 3, 2026** ballot a constitutional amendment that replaces a single statewide majority with a requirement that **citizen-initiated constitutional amendments win a simple majority in *each* congressional district (8 of 8)**—a *first-of-its-kind* rule in the U.S. . - ---- - -## Record Snapshot (salient facts) - -* **Novelty:** Eleven states use supermajority thresholds for some ballot measures, but **none** require approval in **each congressional district** . -* **Current map context:** Missouri has **6 Republican** and **2 Democratic** U.S. House districts; all eight were won by double digits in 2024 . -* **Legislative path:** HJR 3 passed the House **98–58** (98 R yes; 52 D + 6 R no) and the Senate **21–11** (21 R yes; 9 D + 2 R no) . -* **Stated justifications:** Proponents frame it as ensuring “broad consensus” across equally populated districts; opponents argue it **dilutes citizen power** and imposes a stricter standard on citizen initiatives than on legislature-referred measures . -* **Bundled provisions:** Adds a constitutional ban on foreign national contributions — this would constitutionalize a state-level prohibition for ballot-measure campaigns, which federal law does not clearly cover; many states have enacted similar bans, and some are under active litigation (e.g., Maine). -* **Another moving part:** The General Assembly approved **new congressional district boundaries** this month, relevant because the proposal hardwires district consent into the initiative process . - ---- - -## Method View (what this measure *does*, civically) - -**Unit of consent** is shifted from **one statewide electorate** to **eight separate district electorates**. A simple statewide majority can be **nullified** by failing to win a majority in any single district. This is not a mere threshold increase; it is a **structural veto** inserted at the district level. - ---- - -## Civic Effects (testable, record-based) - -1. **Minority Veto via Map Structure** - Given a stable 6–2 district alignment, a statewide majority could be blocked by failing to carry all eight districts—even when overall votes favor passage. The veto power **tracks district lines**, not aggregate consent . - -2. **Asymmetry Between Citizens and Legislature** - Opponents note the stricter standard applies to **citizen-initiated** constitutional amendments but not to measures placed by the **legislature**, creating an institutional preference against direct democracy . - -3. **Constitutionalizing Procedure** - Bundled items (foreign money ban, hearings, full text with ballots) move procedural controls from statute to **constitutional** status, raising the cost of later reform—even for benign administrative tweaks . - -4. **Sensitivity to Redistricting** - Because district majorities become dispositive, **district boundaries** (and their partisan geography) gain outsized influence over the initiative process. The article notes new maps were just approved, which heightens this sensitivity . - ---- - -## Arguments in the Record (verbatim direction, summarized) - -* **Proponents:** District majorities ensure “broad consensus” across equally populated districts—fairness by geography and population parity . -* **Opponents:** It **dilutes citizen votes** and applies unequal standards to citizen vs. legislature-initiated measures—removing power from people and insulating lawmakers’ preferred route . - ---- - -## CIVICVS Reading (civic consequence) - -The complexity here is functional: by **redefining consent**, the rule makes success contingent on **map-distributed** approval rather than **statewide** approval. In practical terms, it **narrows** the future capacity of citizens to amend their constitution and **elevates** district line-drawing as a gatekeeper to constitutional change. The record supports classifying this as **structural manipulation cloaked in consensus language**—a predictable effect traceable to the current 6–2 district reality and the newly approved boundaries . - ---- - -## Predictions (falsifiable) - -* Measures that poll **>55% statewide** but are **ideologically uneven** across districts will **fail** more often than under current rules. -* Pass likelihood will correlate more tightly with **district partisan distribution** than with **statewide median voter** preferences. -* Post-2026, there will be a measurable **drop** in the number of successful **citizen-initiated constitutional amendments** relative to pre-change baselines (controlling for topic mix). - ---- - -If you want, I can now append a **short “Record Table”** (votes, map split, bundled provisions) to this draft for quick reference, or keep it exactly as-is.