From c6aa42d4a749f3cd14c2c221c6814fde31097c40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: TheRON Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2025 15:48:09 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] Initial create --- .../Civic_Analysis_(Draft).md | 77 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 77 insertions(+) create mode 100644 docs/samples/DailyBrew__Missouri_Supermajority_2026/Civic_Analysis_(Draft).md diff --git a/docs/samples/DailyBrew__Missouri_Supermajority_2026/Civic_Analysis_(Draft).md b/docs/samples/DailyBrew__Missouri_Supermajority_2026/Civic_Analysis_(Draft).md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d1a312b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/samples/DailyBrew__Missouri_Supermajority_2026/Civic_Analysis_(Draft).md @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +Here’s a **CIVICVS-style draft** you can drop into your workspace. I’ve kept it lean and transcript-ready. + +--- + +# Civic Analysis (Draft): Missouri’s District-by-District Supermajority for Citizen Initiatives + +## Source + +Lara Bonatesta. *“Missouri voters to decide on 2026 measure to create a first-of-its-kind citizen initiative supermajority requirement.”* +**Ballotpedia, Daily Brew**, 18 September 2025. +[https://info.ballotpedia.org/dm?id=34D56BF65BDE86C99102C4F577E443A96E43630501AD63A4](https://info.ballotpedia.org/dm?id=34D56BF65BDE86C99102C4F577E443A96E43630501AD63A4) +(Local copy preserved as `DailyBrew__Missouri_Supermajority_2026.pdf`). +*Accessed 18 September 2025, 11:15 AM (CDT).* + +--- + +## Claim in the Record + +Missouri will place on the **Nov. 3, 2026** ballot a constitutional amendment that replaces a single statewide majority with a requirement that **citizen-initiated constitutional amendments win a simple majority in *each* congressional district (8 of 8)**—a *first-of-its-kind* rule in the U.S. . + +--- + +## Record Snapshot (salient facts) + +* **Novelty:** Eleven states use supermajority thresholds for some ballot measures, but **none** require approval in **each congressional district** . +* **Current map context:** Missouri has **6 Republican** and **2 Democratic** U.S. House districts; all eight were won by double digits in 2024 . +* **Legislative path:** HJR 3 passed the House **98–58** (98 R yes; 52 D + 6 R no) and the Senate **21–11** (21 R yes; 9 D + 2 R no) . +* **Stated justifications:** Proponents frame it as ensuring “broad consensus” across equally populated districts; opponents argue it **dilutes citizen power** and imposes a stricter standard on citizen initiatives than on legislature-referred measures . +* **Bundled provisions:** Adds a constitutional ban on foreign national contributions — this would constitutionalize a state-level prohibition for ballot-measure campaigns, which federal law does not clearly cover; many states have enacted similar bans, and some are under active litigation (e.g., Maine). +* **Another moving part:** The General Assembly approved **new congressional district boundaries** this month, relevant because the proposal hardwires district consent into the initiative process . + +--- + +## Method View (what this measure *does*, civically) + +**Unit of consent** is shifted from **one statewide electorate** to **eight separate district electorates**. A simple statewide majority can be **nullified** by failing to win a majority in any single district. This is not a mere threshold increase; it is a **structural veto** inserted at the district level. + +--- + +## Civic Effects (testable, record-based) + +1. **Minority Veto via Map Structure** + Given a stable 6–2 district alignment, a statewide majority could be blocked by failing to carry all eight districts—even when overall votes favor passage. The veto power **tracks district lines**, not aggregate consent . + +2. **Asymmetry Between Citizens and Legislature** + Opponents note the stricter standard applies to **citizen-initiated** constitutional amendments but not to measures placed by the **legislature**, creating an institutional preference against direct democracy . + +3. **Constitutionalizing Procedure** + Bundled items (foreign money ban, hearings, full text with ballots) move procedural controls from statute to **constitutional** status, raising the cost of later reform—even for benign administrative tweaks . + +4. **Sensitivity to Redistricting** + Because district majorities become dispositive, **district boundaries** (and their partisan geography) gain outsized influence over the initiative process. The article notes new maps were just approved, which heightens this sensitivity . + +--- + +## Arguments in the Record (verbatim direction, summarized) + +* **Proponents:** District majorities ensure “broad consensus” across equally populated districts—fairness by geography and population parity . +* **Opponents:** It **dilutes citizen votes** and applies unequal standards to citizen vs. legislature-initiated measures—removing power from people and insulating lawmakers’ preferred route . + +--- + +## CIVICVS Reading (civic consequence) + +The complexity here is functional: by **redefining consent**, the rule makes success contingent on **map-distributed** approval rather than **statewide** approval. In practical terms, it **narrows** the future capacity of citizens to amend their constitution and **elevates** district line-drawing as a gatekeeper to constitutional change. The record supports classifying this as **structural manipulation cloaked in consensus language**—a predictable effect traceable to the current 6–2 district reality and the newly approved boundaries . + +--- + +## Predictions (falsifiable) + +* Measures that poll **>55% statewide** but are **ideologically uneven** across districts will **fail** more often than under current rules. +* Pass likelihood will correlate more tightly with **district partisan distribution** than with **statewide median voter** preferences. +* Post-2026, there will be a measurable **drop** in the number of successful **citizen-initiated constitutional amendments** relative to pre-change baselines (controlling for topic mix). + +--- + +If you want, I can now append a **short “Record Table”** (votes, map split, bundled provisions) to this draft for quick reference, or keep it exactly as-is.