Four documents brought into line with what landed at54f0296andee3fedf. HANDOFF section 4 item 5 said the ACL was deliberately last. It is deleted, not deferred. Authorisation lives upstream at the last proxy hop, decided against a membership system this repository knows nothing about, so the compiler will never have a user table, a login form, a session, or a group name in any form -- including as a configuration value, which is how that leak arrives by the side door. An item left the roadmap rather than moving down it. Item 4 claimed persistence was the prerequisite for a library of saved designs and for access control. The second half has been false since the identity contract landed and was found by reading the anchor rather than recalling it. Corrected, and item 4 now states the position that follows: the filesystem is the first store, not a database. Design records are already plain text, already content-addressed by input_id, and already readable by someone with none of this software. A directory of them is a store with perfect provenance and no schema to migrate. SQL earns its way in when there is a query walking files cannot answer -- "every design by this author since March" is that query, and it arrives with membership, not before. "Acceptable for a development name" is withdrawn from HANDOFF section 4 and WORK-ORDER-004 section 3. The name is production, dev abbreviates Mechanical Compiler Developers, and it appears on printed material. The posture is unchanged -- world-reachable, unauthenticated, /m/ not yet gated, STL export will ship open -- but it is carried openly as open question 10 instead of excused. The phrase survived three documents and two earlier corrections because it was plausible and nobody challenged it, which is the same mechanism that produced the stale ingress paragraph. Section 0 gains the two new documents, with CONSUMER_INTERFACE_GATES.md marked read-before-proposing-an-integration: several tempting cross-project moves are recorded there specifically as things not to build yet, and a successor who finds them independently will be tempted to solve them. Also a note that deploy/ now holds the unit and the vhost as they actually run, and that the repository is the single source of truth -- read a container when you suspect drift, then fix the drift here rather than on the host. HANDOFF section 1 and PROCESS section 9 gain the same rule: pct exec runs no shell. A glob, redirect, pipe or && is expanded by the host shell against the host's filesystem and the container receives whatever literal survives, so an unwrapped glob reports "No such file or directory" and reads as a broken container. Third instance of this class after F-035 and F-036 -- each time the tool was invoked wrongly and the error named the wrong subject. Not filed as a new failure: it is the same finding as those two, and a third entry would record the instance rather than the pattern. STAGING-STATE records the deployment configuration as committed. The unit had been marked delivered at deploy/mechcomp.service on 11 SEP while existing only on the host.
6.0 KiB
WORK-ORDER-004 — public ingress for the composer
CLOSED 2026-09-11. The composer is live at https://dev.mechcomp.kane-il.us.
| Mode | Infrastructure (PROCESS.md §2) |
| Created | 2026-09-11 |
| Closed | 2026-09-11 |
| Executed on | wg-pk and srv-b, by CIVICVS |
0. This document was rewritten mid-execution
The original proposed widening AllowedIPs on the hub's peer entry for srv-b
to carry 10.20.0.0/24, adding a route, and warned at length about the lockout
risk of changing a live WireGuard peer.
None of that was done, and none of it was necessary. It was written before reading the hub, from an assumption about how the estate must be wired.
Reading it showed the convention: every vhost on wg-pk —
witness.diagnostics.kane-il.us, otium.civicus.us, shell.infra.civicus.us,
corpusdb.infra.civicus.us — proxies to a 10.110.0.x tunnel address directly.
Not one routes into a subnet behind a peer. All twenty peers carry a /32.
Following that convention removed the WireGuard change entirely, and with it the
only step that could have locked the operator out of srv-b.
The original text is in git history at a8081e1. It is kept there rather than
here, because a work order describing a plan nobody executed is exactly the stale
record this project does not tolerate.
1. What was actually built
browser
-> dev.mechcomp.kane-il.us A 198.58.111.109
AAAA 2600:3c00::f03c:92ff:fe42:43d7
-> nginx on wg-pk, Let's Encrypt TLS, expires 2026-12-10
-> proxy_pass http://10.110.0.12:8770 srv-b's own tunnel address
-> DNAT on srv-b -> 10.20.0.10:8770
-> mechcomp.service in CT 100
Four changes, in the order made:
1. DNAT on srv-b, added live, persisted only after being proven from the
hub. Rollback copy at /etc/iptables/rules.v4.before-mechcomp-dnat.
-A PREROUTING -s 10.110.0.1/32 -d 10.110.0.12/32 -i wg0 \
-p tcp -m tcp --dport 8770 -j DNAT --to-destination 10.20.0.10:8770
Scoped to the hub as source. The other nineteen tunnel peers cannot reach the service network through it.
curl http://10.110.0.12:8770 from srv-b itself fails, correctly:
locally-originated traffic traverses OUTPUT, not PREROUTING. Test from the
hub.
2. DNS. A and AAAA for dev.mechcomp.kane-il.us, TTL 300. Not a CNAME —
the hub's other names are all A/AAAA, and matching the zone's own convention beat
the marginal tidiness of an alias. The AAAA was safe to publish immediately
because witness and otium already carry listen [::]:443 ssl.
Nothing was created at mechcomp.kane-il.us: CIVICVS never serves at the root of
a subdomain.
3. Port-80 vhost on wg-pk, no TLS. HTTP-01 needs a live vhost to validate
against, and a listen 443 block naming certificate paths that do not exist yet
fails nginx -t and takes the reload down with every other site.
4. certbot --nginx -d dev.mechcomp.kane-il.us, run once. HTTP-01 through
the nginx plugin, matching all four existing certificates — verified by reading
/etc/letsencrypt/renewal/*.conf rather than assuming. No DNS plugin is
installed and BIND was not involved. Certbot wrote the 443 block, the redirect
and the certificate lines into the same file.
2. Acceptance — all met 2026-09-11
| Criterion | Result | |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://dev.mechcomp.kane-il.us/ from outside |
200 |
| 2 | Let's Encrypt chain, no -k |
issued, expires 2026-12-10 |
| 3 | /api/build returns real JSON |
confirmed |
| 4 | Reachable over IPv6 | 200 |
| 5 | HTTP redirects rather than serving plaintext | 301 |
| 6 | Negative: mechanical-compiler.dev.infra still answers |
200 |
| 7 | Negative: CT 100 direct still answers | 200 |
| 8 | Negative: mail from srv-b still delivers |
delivered to theron@ via wg-pk and mx1 |
The three negatives matter as much as the positives. iptables-save rewrote the
whole ruleset on srv-b, and mail traverses the same wg0 interface the DNAT
was added to. POSTROUTING order was verified unchanged — the RETURN still
precedes both masquerades.
3. What this did not settle
- Renewal has never been observed to succeed for this name. The certbot timer
is scheduled and the other four certificates are managed identically, but the
first renewal for
dev.mechcompis due before 2026-12-10 and nobody has watched one complete.certbot renew --dry-runcounts against a rate limit and was not repeated after one attempt timed out. - No acceptance criteria exist for the composer itself, only for the path to
it. A
200says the chain works, not that the page is right. - The service has no authentication. It is world-reachable and computes
geometry for anyone who asks. An earlier version of this bullet called that
acceptable for a development name. It is not:
devabbreviates Mechanical Compiler Developers, the name is production, and it appears on printed material. Corrected 12 SEP — the posture is unchanged and the justification is withdrawn.docs/IDENTITY-CONTRACT.mdspecifies how it will be gated and by whom.
4. Found while working, not this project's to fix
shell.infra.civicus.us and corpusdb.infra.civicus.us publish AAAA
2600:3c00:e000:365::. wg-pk holds 2600:4c00:e000:365:: — one hex digit
apart, 3c against 4c. Both names are unreachable for v6-preferring clients
right now, while v4 clients see working sites: the intermittent fault that
looks like anything except DNS.
Recorded in STAGING-STATE.md §6 so it does not evaporate with the scrollback.
5. Method note
The one thing that made this go quickly, after several turns of it not going quickly at all: read the estate's own conventions before designing against it. Every wrong turn in this work order's history — a route that was not needed, a lockout risk that did not exist, a CNAME where the zone uses A/AAAA, a DNS-01 challenge where HTTP-01 was already standard — came from proposing a design before reading what four working services already did.