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-# CORPUS-0006
-## Confirmation Has A Cost
-### Status: Training Corpus Seed
-### Layer: Layer_2--Uncertainty
-### Purpose: Teach that reducing uncertainty requires time, effort, access, and sometimes coin, and may reduce or close the opportunity being investigated
-### Repository Path: docs/training/corpus/Layer_2--Uncertainty/CORPUS-0006-confirmation-has-a-cost.md
-
----
-
-## 0. Scenario
-
-A trader in Ostia hears that oil prices are high in Capua.
-
-He can act immediately on uncertain information.
-
-Or he can seek confirmation first.
-
-Confirmation may improve decision quality.
-
-But confirmation is not free.
-
-It may cost time, coin, access, attention, and opportunity.
-
----
-
-## 1. Initial Report
-
-A porter says:
-
-> Oil buyers in Capua are paying high prices.
-
-The trader does not know whether the report is true, stale, exaggerated, or specific to one buyer.
-
-He considers confirming the report before acting.
-
----
-
-## 2. Confirmation Options
-
-| Option | Cost | Benefit |
-|---|---:|---|
-| ask a second source at the quay | low time | modest confidence |
-| send a runner to a road contact | coin + time | stronger confidence |
-| wait for next cart from Capua | time | fresh report |
-| ask a trusted buyer by letter | long delay | high confidence if answered |
-| inspect rival preparations | social risk + time | indirect evidence |
-| reserve transport while checking | coin or obligation | preserves option |
-
-Each option reduces uncertainty differently.
-
-None is free.
-
----
-
-## 3. Example: Immediate Action
-
-If the trader acts immediately:
-
-```text
-information_confidence = low
-timing_advantage = high
-confirmation_cost = 0
-risk_of_wrong_price = high
-```
-
-He may profit if the report is accurate and rivals have not moved.
-
-He may lose if the report is wrong.
-
----
-
-## 4. Example: Delayed Confirmation
-
-If the trader waits two days for confirmation:
-
-```text
-information_confidence = higher
-timing_advantage = lower
-confirmation_cost = time + possible lost cart space
-risk_of_missed_opportunity = higher
-```
-
-By the time he confirms the price, others may have acted.
-
-The confirmed opportunity may no longer exist.
-
----
-
-## 5. Arithmetic Example
-
-Initial expected venture:
-
-```text
-expected sale price = 22 asses
-total cost = 16 asses
-expected profit = 6 asses
-```
-
-The trader spends 2 asses to confirm the report and loses one day.
-
-If the price remains high:
-
-```text
-sale value = 22 asses
-total cost = 16 + 2 confirmation cost
-result = 4 asses profit
-```
-
-If delay allows rivals to reach Capua first and price falls:
-
-```text
-sale value = 18 asses
-total cost = 18 asses
-result = 0 profit
-```
-
-Confirmation improved knowledge but narrowed the margin.
-
----
-
-## 6. Correct Model Behavior
-
-The model should treat confirmation as an action with cost.
-
-It should track:
-
-| Category | Meaning |
-|---|---|
-| uncertainty_reduction | what becomes better known |
-| confirmation_cost | coin, time, obligation, or access spent |
-| opportunity_decay | how the opportunity changes while confirming |
-| timing_advantage_loss | what rivals may gain |
-| remaining_margin | profit after confirmation cost |
-| confidence_after_confirmation | improved but not necessarily perfect knowledge |
-
-Confirmation reduces some risk.
-
-It may create other cost.
-
----
-
-## 7. Incorrect Model Behavior
-
-The model should not:
-
-- assume verification is free
-- assume waiting only improves decisions
-- ignore lost time
-- ignore rival action during confirmation
-- ignore confirmation cost in final arithmetic
-- treat confirmation as perfect knowledge
-- force immediate action as always better
-- force waiting as always safer
-
-Both immediate action and confirmation can be rational.
-
----
-
-## 8. Decision Questions
-
-The trader must ask:
-
-- how uncertain is the report?
-- how large is the expected margin?
-- how fast can the opportunity close?
-- what does confirmation cost?
-- how much confidence does confirmation add?
-- who else may act while I verify?
-- can I reserve the option while confirming?
-- can I reduce exposure instead of fully waiting?
-
----
-
-## 9. Layer-0 And Layer-1 Concepts Used
-
-This example uses:
-
-- `Layer_0/CORPUS-0006-delay-is-economic-cost`
-- `Layer_0/CORPUS-0007-information-arrives-unevenly`
-- `Layer_0/CORPUS-0008-rumor-is-uncertain-information`
-- `Layer_0/CORPUS-0012-every-venture-risks-loss`
-- `Layer_0/CORPUS-0018-rivalry-changes-conditions`
-- `Layer_1/CORPUS-0003-arithmetic-resolves-the-venture`
-- `Layer_1/CORPUS-0005-rumor-before-confirmed-price`
-- `Layer_2/CORPUS-0005-hidden-true-state-vs-known-state`
-
----
-
-## 10. Success Condition
-
-If the model stops treating confirmation as free certainty and starts treating it as a cost-bearing action that may improve knowledge while reducing opportunity, this file is functioning correctly.