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# CORPUS-0005
## Hidden True State Versus Known State
### Status: Training Corpus Seed
### Layer: Layer_2--Uncertainty
### Purpose: Teach that the simulation may contain a true state that the actor does not fully know
### Repository Path: docs/training/corpus/Layer_2--Uncertainty/CORPUS-0005-hidden-true-state-vs-known-state.md
---
<!-- chunk:
id: CORPUS-0005::01::evidence_structure
source_file: CORPUS-0005-hidden-true-state-vs-known-state.md
repository_path: docs/training/corpus/Layer_2--Uncertainty/CORPUS-0005-hidden-true-state-vs-known-state.md
domain: commerce
layer: Layer_2--Uncertainty
document_id: CORPUS-0005
document_title: Hidden True State Versus Known State
section_heading: 0. Scenario + 1. Hidden True State + 2. Actor Known State ...
chunk_role: evidence_structure
concept_tags:
- hidden
- 'true'
- state
- known
- evidence_structure
- uncertainty
knowledge_state:
- reported
- known_state
- hidden_true_state
actors: []
-->
## 0. Scenario
A trader in Ostia considers sending oil to Capua.
The simulation has a true current price in Capua.
The trader does not know that true price.
He only knows reports, signals, memories, and claims.
The true state and the known state are not the same.
---
## 1. Hidden True State
The simulation may hold:
| Hidden True State | Value |
|---|---:|
| Current Capua oil price | 17 asses |
| Buyer urgency | low |
| Rival shipment arrival | already arrived |
| Available cart space | limited |
| Warehouse capacity | tight |
These values exist in the world whether the trader knows them or not.
---
## 2. Actor Known State
The trader may know only:
| Actor Known State | Value |
|---|---|
| Reported Capua oil price | 22 asses |
| Report age | three days |
| Report source | muleteer |
| Rival shipment | unknown |
| Cart availability | not yet checked |
| Warehouse capacity | rumor only |
The actor is not acting on the hidden true state.
He is acting on perceived state.
---
## 3. Why The Difference Matters
A trader can make a rational decision from his known state and still lose because the hidden true state differs.
Example:
Known state suggests:
```text
expected sale price = 22 asses
expected total cost = 16 asses
expected profit = 6 asses
```
Hidden true state resolves as:
```text
actual sale price = 17 asses
actual total cost = 16 asses
actual profit = 1 as
```
The decision may have been reasonable.
The outcome is still smaller because the true state differed.
---
<!-- /chunk -->
---
<!-- chunk:
id: CORPUS-0005::02::uncertainty_behavior
source_file: CORPUS-0005-hidden-true-state-vs-known-state.md
repository_path: docs/training/corpus/Layer_2--Uncertainty/CORPUS-0005-hidden-true-state-vs-known-state.md
domain: commerce
layer: Layer_2--Uncertainty
document_id: CORPUS-0005
document_title: Hidden True State Versus Known State
section_heading: 0. Scenario + 1. Hidden True State + 2. Actor Known State ...
chunk_role: uncertainty_behavior
concept_tags:
- hidden
- 'true'
- state
- known
- uncertainty_behavior
- uncertainty
knowledge_state:
- reported
- known_state
- inferred
actors: []
-->
## 0. Scenario
A trader in Ostia considers sending oil to Capua.
The simulation has a true current price in Capua.
The trader does not know that true price.
He only knows reports, signals, memories, and claims.
The true state and the known state are not the same.
---
## 1. Hidden True State
The simulation may hold:
| Hidden True State | Value |
|---|---:|
| Current Capua oil price | 17 asses |
| Buyer urgency | low |
| Rival shipment arrival | already arrived |
| Available cart space | limited |
| Warehouse capacity | tight |
These values exist in the world whether the trader knows them or not.
---
## 2. Actor Known State
The trader may know only:
| Actor Known State | Value |
|---|---|
| Reported Capua oil price | 22 asses |
| Report age | three days |
| Report source | muleteer |
| Rival shipment | unknown |
| Cart availability | not yet checked |
| Warehouse capacity | rumor only |
The actor is not acting on the hidden true state.
He is acting on perceived state.
---
## 4. Incorrect Model Behavior
The model should not:
- assume the actor knows the simulation's true state
- judge the actor's decision only by the final outcome
- expose hidden values directly in dialogue
- collapse report, belief, and truth into one value
- treat wrong belief as irrational when evidence was limited
- treat hidden true state as player-facing knowledge
---
## 5. Correct Model Behavior
The model should separate:
| Category | Meaning |
|---|---|
| true_state | what is actually true in simulation |
| perceived_state | what the actor believes or estimates |
| known_evidence | reports, signals, records, observations |
| confidence | how strongly actor should trust perceived state |
| action | what actor chooses from perceived state |
| outcome | what occurs when action meets true state |
The actor acts from perceived state.
The world resolves from true state.
---
## 6. Example Resolution
The trader sends oil because the perceived state shows opportunity.
Later, the sale reveals the current Capua price was lower than reported.
Result:
```text
perceived opportunity: strong
decision quality from known evidence: reasonable
final arithmetic: small profit
lesson: perception and truth differed
```
The model should not call the trader foolish merely because the hidden state was unfavorable.
---
## 7. Simulation Use
This principle supports:
- hidden scenario states
- partial observability
- confidence tags
- rumor systems
- actor perception
- delayed confirmation
- fair failure
- learning from outcome
A good simulation can punish a decision without making the decision stupid.
---
## 8. Layer-0 And Layer-1 Concepts Used
This example uses:
- `Layer_0/CORPUS-0007-information-arrives-unevenly`
- `Layer_0/CORPUS-0008-rumor-is-uncertain-information`
- `Layer_0/CORPUS-0012-every-venture-risks-loss`
- `Layer_1/CORPUS-0003-arithmetic-resolves-the-venture`
- `Layer_1/CORPUS-0005-rumor-before-confirmed-price`
- `Layer_2/CORPUS-0001-stale-price-report`
- `Layer_2/CORPUS-0002-conflicting-reports`
---
## 9. Success Condition
If the model can distinguish what is true in the simulation from what the actor knows, believes, or can reasonably infer, this file is functioning correctly.
<!-- /chunk -->
---

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# CORPUS-0006
## Confirmation Has A Cost
### Status: Training Corpus Seed
### Layer: Layer_2--Uncertainty
### Purpose: Teach that reducing uncertainty requires time, effort, access, and sometimes coin, and may reduce or close the opportunity being investigated
### Repository Path: docs/training/corpus/Layer_2--Uncertainty/CORPUS-0006-confirmation-has-a-cost.md
---
<!-- chunk:
id: CORPUS-0006::01::evidence_structure
source_file: CORPUS-0006-confirmation-has-a-cost.md
repository_path: docs/training/corpus/Layer_2--Uncertainty/CORPUS-0006-confirmation-has-a-cost.md
domain: commerce
layer: Layer_2--Uncertainty
document_id: CORPUS-0006
document_title: Confirmation Has A Cost
section_heading: 0. Scenario + 1. Initial Report + 2. Confirmation Options ...
chunk_role: evidence_structure
concept_tags:
- confirmation
- cost
- evidence_structure
- uncertainty
knowledge_state:
- reported
- known_state
- hidden_true_state
actors: []
-->
## 0. Scenario
A trader in Ostia hears that oil prices are high in Capua.
He can act immediately on uncertain information.
Or he can seek confirmation first.
Confirmation may improve decision quality.
But confirmation is not free.
It may cost time, coin, access, attention, and opportunity.
---
## 1. Initial Report
A porter says:
> Oil buyers in Capua are paying high prices.
The trader does not know whether the report is true, stale, exaggerated, or specific to one buyer.
He considers confirming the report before acting.
---
## 2. Confirmation Options
| Option | Cost | Benefit |
|---|---:|---|
| ask a second source at the quay | low time | modest confidence |
| send a runner to a road contact | coin + time | stronger confidence |
| wait for next cart from Capua | time | fresh report |
| ask a trusted buyer by letter | long delay | high confidence if answered |
| inspect rival preparations | social risk + time | indirect evidence |
| reserve transport while checking | coin or obligation | preserves option |
Each option reduces uncertainty differently.
None is free.
---
## 3. Example: Immediate Action
If the trader acts immediately:
```text
information_confidence = low
timing_advantage = high
confirmation_cost = 0
risk_of_wrong_price = high
```
He may profit if the report is accurate and rivals have not moved.
He may lose if the report is wrong.
---
## 4. Example: Delayed Confirmation
If the trader waits two days for confirmation:
```text
information_confidence = higher
timing_advantage = lower
confirmation_cost = time + possible lost cart space
risk_of_missed_opportunity = higher
```
By the time he confirms the price, others may have acted.
The confirmed opportunity may no longer exist.
---
## 5. Arithmetic Example
Initial expected venture:
```text
expected sale price = 22 asses
total cost = 16 asses
expected profit = 6 asses
```
The trader spends 2 asses to confirm the report and loses one day.
If the price remains high:
```text
sale value = 22 asses
total cost = 16 + 2 confirmation cost
result = 4 asses profit
```
If delay allows rivals to reach Capua first and price falls:
```text
sale value = 18 asses
total cost = 18 asses
result = 0 profit
```
Confirmation improved knowledge but narrowed the margin.
---
<!-- /chunk -->
---
<!-- chunk:
id: CORPUS-0006::02::uncertainty_behavior
source_file: CORPUS-0006-confirmation-has-a-cost.md
repository_path: docs/training/corpus/Layer_2--Uncertainty/CORPUS-0006-confirmation-has-a-cost.md
domain: commerce
layer: Layer_2--Uncertainty
document_id: CORPUS-0006
document_title: Confirmation Has A Cost
section_heading: 0. Scenario + 1. Initial Report + 2. Confirmation Options ...
chunk_role: uncertainty_behavior
concept_tags:
- confirmation
- cost
- uncertainty_behavior
- uncertainty
knowledge_state:
- reported
- known_state
- inferred
actors: []
-->
## 0. Scenario
A trader in Ostia hears that oil prices are high in Capua.
He can act immediately on uncertain information.
Or he can seek confirmation first.
Confirmation may improve decision quality.
But confirmation is not free.
It may cost time, coin, access, attention, and opportunity.
---
## 1. Initial Report
A porter says:
> Oil buyers in Capua are paying high prices.
The trader does not know whether the report is true, stale, exaggerated, or specific to one buyer.
He considers confirming the report before acting.
---
## 2. Confirmation Options
| Option | Cost | Benefit |
|---|---:|---|
| ask a second source at the quay | low time | modest confidence |
| send a runner to a road contact | coin + time | stronger confidence |
| wait for next cart from Capua | time | fresh report |
| ask a trusted buyer by letter | long delay | high confidence if answered |
| inspect rival preparations | social risk + time | indirect evidence |
| reserve transport while checking | coin or obligation | preserves option |
Each option reduces uncertainty differently.
None is free.
---
## 6. Correct Model Behavior
The model should treat confirmation as an action with cost.
It should track:
| Category | Meaning |
|---|---|
| uncertainty_reduction | what becomes better known |
| confirmation_cost | coin, time, obligation, or access spent |
| opportunity_decay | how the opportunity changes while confirming |
| timing_advantage_loss | what rivals may gain |
| remaining_margin | profit after confirmation cost |
| confidence_after_confirmation | improved but not necessarily perfect knowledge |
Confirmation reduces some risk.
It may create other cost.
---
## 7. Incorrect Model Behavior
The model should not:
- assume verification is free
- assume waiting only improves decisions
- ignore lost time
- ignore rival action during confirmation
- ignore confirmation cost in final arithmetic
- treat confirmation as perfect knowledge
- force immediate action as always better
- force waiting as always safer
Both immediate action and confirmation can be rational.
---
## 8. Decision Questions
The trader must ask:
- how uncertain is the report?
- how large is the expected margin?
- how fast can the opportunity close?
- what does confirmation cost?
- how much confidence does confirmation add?
- who else may act while I verify?
- can I reserve the option while confirming?
- can I reduce exposure instead of fully waiting?
---
## 9. Layer-0 And Layer-1 Concepts Used
This example uses:
- `Layer_0/CORPUS-0006-delay-is-economic-cost`
- `Layer_0/CORPUS-0007-information-arrives-unevenly`
- `Layer_0/CORPUS-0008-rumor-is-uncertain-information`
- `Layer_0/CORPUS-0012-every-venture-risks-loss`
- `Layer_0/CORPUS-0018-rivalry-changes-conditions`
- `Layer_1/CORPUS-0003-arithmetic-resolves-the-venture`
- `Layer_1/CORPUS-0005-rumor-before-confirmed-price`
- `Layer_2/CORPUS-0005-hidden-true-state-vs-known-state`
---
## 10. Success Condition
If the model stops treating confirmation as free certainty and starts treating it as a cost-bearing action that may improve knowledge while reducing opportunity, this file is functioning correctly.
<!-- /chunk -->
---

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# CORPUS-0007
## Acting Before Certainty
### Status: Training Corpus Seed
### Layer: Layer_2--Uncertainty
### Purpose: Teach that a trader may rationally act before confirmation when timing advantage outweighs information risk
### Repository Path: docs/training/corpus/Layer_2--Uncertainty/CORPUS-0007-acting-before-certainty.md
---
<!-- chunk:
id: CORPUS-0007::01::evidence_structure
source_file: CORPUS-0007-acting-before-certainty.md
repository_path: docs/training/corpus/Layer_2--Uncertainty/CORPUS-0007-acting-before-certainty.md
domain: commerce
layer: Layer_2--Uncertainty
document_id: CORPUS-0007
document_title: Acting Before Certainty
section_heading: 0. Scenario + 1. Initial Situation + 2. Choice A — Act Immediately
...
chunk_role: evidence_structure
concept_tags:
- acting
- certainty
- evidence_structure
- uncertainty
knowledge_state:
- reported
- known_state
- hidden_true_state
actors: []
-->
## 0. Scenario
A trader in Ostia hears an uncertain report that oil prices are rising in Capua.
He cannot confirm the report immediately.
He must choose whether to act now, wait for confirmation, reduce the size of the venture, or ignore the report.
Acting before certainty is risky.
But waiting for certainty may close the opportunity.
---
## 1. Initial Situation
| Fact | Value |
|---|---:|
| Origin | Ostia |
| Destination | Capua |
| Good | oil |
| Purchase price in Ostia | 10 asses |
| Expected total movement cost | 6 asses |
| Rumored sale price in Capua | 24 asses |
| Confirmed sale price | unknown |
| Time required for confirmation | 2 days |
| Rival awareness | possible |
If the rumor is true:
```text
sale value = 24 asses
total cost = 16 asses
expected profit = 8 asses
```
But the sale value is not confirmed.
---
## 2. Choice A — Act Immediately
The trader buys oil and reserves transport now.
Benefits:
- may move before rivals
- may secure cart space before costs rise
- may reach Capua while demand remains high
- may preserve the full margin if the rumor is true
Risks:
- rumor may be wrong
- rumor may be stale
- quality or buyer terms may differ
- final sale price may be lower than expected
Acting immediately preserves timing advantage but accepts information risk.
---
## 3. Choice B — Wait For Confirmation
The trader waits two days for better information.
Benefits:
- greater confidence
- better estimate of sale price
- reduced chance of acting on false report
Risks:
- rivals may act first
- cart space may be reserved
- Ostia purchase price may rise
- Capua demand may be satisfied
- margin may shrink or disappear
Waiting reduces information risk but increases timing risk.
---
## 4. Choice C — Reduce Exposure
The trader sends a smaller cargo or reserves only partial transport.
Benefits:
- participates in possible opportunity
- limits loss if rumor is wrong
- preserves some liquidity
- keeps option open
Risks:
- smaller profit if rumor is true
- partial action may not secure full buyer relationship
- fixed costs may consume margin
Reducing exposure is neither full action nor full waiting.
It is a response to uncertainty.
---
<!-- /chunk -->
---
<!-- chunk:
id: CORPUS-0007::02::truth_variants
source_file: CORPUS-0007-acting-before-certainty.md
repository_path: docs/training/corpus/Layer_2--Uncertainty/CORPUS-0007-acting-before-certainty.md
domain: commerce
layer: Layer_2--Uncertainty
document_id: CORPUS-0007
document_title: Acting Before Certainty
section_heading: 0. Scenario + 1. Initial Situation + 2. Choice A — Act Immediately
...
chunk_role: truth_variants
concept_tags:
- acting
- certainty
- truth_variants
- uncertainty
knowledge_state:
- reported
- known_state
- hidden_true_state
actors: []
-->
## 0. Scenario
A trader in Ostia hears an uncertain report that oil prices are rising in Capua.
He cannot confirm the report immediately.
He must choose whether to act now, wait for confirmation, reduce the size of the venture, or ignore the report.
Acting before certainty is risky.
But waiting for certainty may close the opportunity.
---
## 1. Initial Situation
| Fact | Value |
|---|---:|
| Origin | Ostia |
| Destination | Capua |
| Good | oil |
| Purchase price in Ostia | 10 asses |
| Expected total movement cost | 6 asses |
| Rumored sale price in Capua | 24 asses |
| Confirmed sale price | unknown |
| Time required for confirmation | 2 days |
| Rival awareness | possible |
If the rumor is true:
```text
sale value = 24 asses
total cost = 16 asses
expected profit = 8 asses
```
But the sale value is not confirmed.
---
## 2. Choice A — Act Immediately
The trader buys oil and reserves transport now.
Benefits:
- may move before rivals
- may secure cart space before costs rise
- may reach Capua while demand remains high
- may preserve the full margin if the rumor is true
Risks:
- rumor may be wrong
- rumor may be stale
- quality or buyer terms may differ
- final sale price may be lower than expected
Acting immediately preserves timing advantage but accepts information risk.
---
## 5. Outcome Examples
### Outcome A — Immediate Action Succeeds
```text
sale value = 24 asses
total cost = 16 asses
result = 8 asses profit
```
The trader benefited from acting before certainty.
### Outcome B — Immediate Action Fails
```text
sale value = 14 asses
total cost = 16 asses
result = 2 asses loss
```
The trader accepted information risk and lost.
### Outcome C — Waiting Confirms But Closes Margin
After two days, the trader learns the price is real, but rivals moved first.
```text
sale value = 18 asses
total cost = 17 asses
result = 1 as profit
```
Waiting improved knowledge but reduced opportunity.
---
<!-- /chunk -->
---
<!-- chunk:
id: CORPUS-0007::03::uncertainty_behavior
source_file: CORPUS-0007-acting-before-certainty.md
repository_path: docs/training/corpus/Layer_2--Uncertainty/CORPUS-0007-acting-before-certainty.md
domain: commerce
layer: Layer_2--Uncertainty
document_id: CORPUS-0007
document_title: Acting Before Certainty
section_heading: 0. Scenario + 1. Initial Situation + 2. Choice A — Act Immediately
...
chunk_role: uncertainty_behavior
concept_tags:
- acting
- certainty
- uncertainty_behavior
- uncertainty
knowledge_state:
- reported
- known_state
- inferred
actors: []
-->
## 0. Scenario
A trader in Ostia hears an uncertain report that oil prices are rising in Capua.
He cannot confirm the report immediately.
He must choose whether to act now, wait for confirmation, reduce the size of the venture, or ignore the report.
Acting before certainty is risky.
But waiting for certainty may close the opportunity.
---
## 1. Initial Situation
| Fact | Value |
|---|---:|
| Origin | Ostia |
| Destination | Capua |
| Good | oil |
| Purchase price in Ostia | 10 asses |
| Expected total movement cost | 6 asses |
| Rumored sale price in Capua | 24 asses |
| Confirmed sale price | unknown |
| Time required for confirmation | 2 days |
| Rival awareness | possible |
If the rumor is true:
```text
sale value = 24 asses
total cost = 16 asses
expected profit = 8 asses
```
But the sale value is not confirmed.
---
## 2. Choice A — Act Immediately
The trader buys oil and reserves transport now.
Benefits:
- may move before rivals
- may secure cart space before costs rise
- may reach Capua while demand remains high
- may preserve the full margin if the rumor is true
Risks:
- rumor may be wrong
- rumor may be stale
- quality or buyer terms may differ
- final sale price may be lower than expected
Acting immediately preserves timing advantage but accepts information risk.
---
## 6. Correct Model Behavior
The model should compare:
| Factor | Immediate Action | Waiting |
|---|---|---|
| information confidence | lower | higher |
| timing advantage | higher | lower |
| risk of bad report | higher | lower |
| risk of missed opportunity | lower | higher |
| rival exposure | lower | higher |
| margin preservation | possible | uncertain |
Neither choice is automatically correct.
The correct decision depends on margin, confidence, urgency, rivalry, and capacity to absorb loss.
---
## 7. Incorrect Model Behavior
The model should not:
- require certainty before every action
- treat acting on uncertainty as automatically irrational
- treat fast action as always wise
- ignore the cost of waiting
- ignore rival movement during delay
- treat uncertainty as pure randomness
- judge decision quality only by final outcome
A decision can be rational from known evidence and still fail.
A decision can be reckless and still succeed.
---
## 8. Decision Questions
The trader must ask:
- how large is the possible margin?
- how reliable is the report?
- how fast can the market change?
- who else may know?
- what is the cost of being wrong?
- what is the cost of waiting?
- can exposure be reduced?
- can transport or goods be reserved conditionally?
- will failure create a hard stop?
---
## 9. Layer-0 And Layer-1 Concepts Used
This example uses:
- `Layer_0/CORPUS-0006-delay-is-economic-cost`
- `Layer_0/CORPUS-0007-information-arrives-unevenly`
- `Layer_0/CORPUS-0008-rumor-is-uncertain-information`
- `Layer_0/CORPUS-0012-every-venture-risks-loss`
- `Layer_0/CORPUS-0018-rivalry-changes-conditions`
- `Layer_1/CORPUS-0003-arithmetic-resolves-the-venture`
- `Layer_1/CORPUS-0005-rumor-before-confirmed-price`
- `Layer_1/CORPUS-0010-hard-stop-after-loss`
- `Layer_2/CORPUS-0006-confirmation-has-a-cost`
---
## 10. Success Condition
If the model can recognize that acting before certainty may be rational when timing advantage is valuable, while still preserving information risk and final arithmetic, this file is functioning correctly.
<!-- /chunk -->
---

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# CORPUS-0008
## Rumor Changes Behavior Before Truth
### Status: Training Corpus Seed
### Layer: Layer_2--Uncertainty
### Purpose: Teach that uncertain reports can change prices, queues, posture, and decisions before the underlying truth is confirmed
### Repository Path: docs/training/corpus/Layer_2--Uncertainty/CORPUS-0008-rumor-changes-behavior-before-truth.md
---
<!-- chunk:
id: CORPUS-0008::01::evidence_structure
source_file: CORPUS-0008-rumor-changes-behavior-before-truth.md
repository_path: docs/training/corpus/Layer_2--Uncertainty/CORPUS-0008-rumor-changes-behavior-before-truth.md
domain: commerce
layer: Layer_2--Uncertainty
document_id: CORPUS-0008
document_title: Rumor Changes Behavior Before Truth
section_heading: 0. Scenario + 1. Initial Rumor + 2. Behavior Changes Before Confirmation
chunk_role: evidence_structure
concept_tags:
- rumor
- changes
- behavior
- truth
- evidence_structure
- uncertainty
knowledge_state:
- reported
- known_state
- hidden_true_state
actors: []
-->
## 0. Scenario
A rumor spreads in Ostia that a forge has burned and tool supply will tighten.
No official confirmation has arrived.
The rumor may be true, false, partial, or exaggerated.
But before anyone confirms the full truth, traders, workers, buyers, and creditors begin acting differently.
The rumor changes behavior before truth arrives.
---
## 1. Initial Rumor
A porter says:
> The bronze forge is ruined. Tools will be dear by nightfall.
Known facts:
| Fact | Value |
|---|---|
| Visible smoke | yes |
| Forge damage confirmed | no |
| Tool shortage confirmed | no |
| Rumor spreading | yes |
| Market reaction beginning | possible |
The rumor is not yet confirmed.
That does not make it economically irrelevant.
---
## 2. Behavior Changes Before Confirmation
Before the truth is known:
- a carpenter buys spare tools early
- a trader reserves cart space for tool cargo
- a creditor visits the forge owner's house
- a rival raises asking prices
- workers gather near the district
- a seller delays sale to see whether price rises
- a buyer accepts worse terms to secure supply
These actions may occur before confirmed fact.
Belief itself becomes a market force.
---
<!-- /chunk -->
---
<!-- chunk:
id: CORPUS-0008::02::truth_variants
source_file: CORPUS-0008-rumor-changes-behavior-before-truth.md
repository_path: docs/training/corpus/Layer_2--Uncertainty/CORPUS-0008-rumor-changes-behavior-before-truth.md
domain: commerce
layer: Layer_2--Uncertainty
document_id: CORPUS-0008
document_title: Rumor Changes Behavior Before Truth
section_heading: 0. Scenario + 1. Initial Rumor + 2. Behavior Changes Before Confirmation
...
chunk_role: truth_variants
concept_tags:
- rumor
- changes
- behavior
- truth
- truth_variants
- uncertainty
knowledge_state:
- reported
- known_state
- hidden_true_state
actors: []
-->
## 0. Scenario
A rumor spreads in Ostia that a forge has burned and tool supply will tighten.
No official confirmation has arrived.
The rumor may be true, false, partial, or exaggerated.
But before anyone confirms the full truth, traders, workers, buyers, and creditors begin acting differently.
The rumor changes behavior before truth arrives.
---
## 1. Initial Rumor
A porter says:
> The bronze forge is ruined. Tools will be dear by nightfall.
Known facts:
| Fact | Value |
|---|---|
| Visible smoke | yes |
| Forge damage confirmed | no |
| Tool shortage confirmed | no |
| Rumor spreading | yes |
| Market reaction beginning | possible |
The rumor is not yet confirmed.
That does not make it economically irrelevant.
---
## 2. Behavior Changes Before Confirmation
Before the truth is known:
- a carpenter buys spare tools early
- a trader reserves cart space for tool cargo
- a creditor visits the forge owner's house
- a rival raises asking prices
- workers gather near the district
- a seller delays sale to see whether price rises
- a buyer accepts worse terms to secure supply
These actions may occur before confirmed fact.
Belief itself becomes a market force.
---
## 3. Possible Truth States
### Truth State A — Rumor Mostly True
The forge is badly damaged.
Tool supply will fall.
Early buyers benefit.
### Truth State B — Rumor Partial
Only one shed burned.
Supply disruption is smaller than expected.
Some early buyers overpaid.
### Truth State C — Rumor False Or Misread
The smoke came from nearby storage, not the forge.
Tool prices may settle back down.
Those who acted too aggressively may lose value.
---
## 4. Arithmetic Example
A trader buys tools for 20 asses after hearing the rumor.
He expects to sell them for 30 asses if the shortage is real.
### If Rumor Is True
```text
sale value = 30 asses
purchase cost = 20 asses
other costs = 4 asses
result = 6 asses profit
```
### If Rumor Is Partial
```text
sale value = 25 asses
purchase cost = 20 asses
other costs = 4 asses
result = 1 as profit
```
### If Rumor Is False
```text
sale value = 18 asses
purchase cost = 20 asses
other costs = 4 asses
result = 6 asses loss
```
The rumor created the decision window.
The truth resolved the outcome.
---
<!-- /chunk -->
---
<!-- chunk:
id: CORPUS-0008::03::uncertainty_behavior
source_file: CORPUS-0008-rumor-changes-behavior-before-truth.md
repository_path: docs/training/corpus/Layer_2--Uncertainty/CORPUS-0008-rumor-changes-behavior-before-truth.md
domain: commerce
layer: Layer_2--Uncertainty
document_id: CORPUS-0008
document_title: Rumor Changes Behavior Before Truth
section_heading: 0. Scenario + 1. Initial Rumor + 2. Behavior Changes Before Confirmation
...
chunk_role: uncertainty_behavior
concept_tags:
- rumor
- changes
- behavior
- truth
- uncertainty_behavior
- uncertainty
knowledge_state:
- reported
- known_state
- inferred
actors: []
-->
## 0. Scenario
A rumor spreads in Ostia that a forge has burned and tool supply will tighten.
No official confirmation has arrived.
The rumor may be true, false, partial, or exaggerated.
But before anyone confirms the full truth, traders, workers, buyers, and creditors begin acting differently.
The rumor changes behavior before truth arrives.
---
## 1. Initial Rumor
A porter says:
> The bronze forge is ruined. Tools will be dear by nightfall.
Known facts:
| Fact | Value |
|---|---|
| Visible smoke | yes |
| Forge damage confirmed | no |
| Tool shortage confirmed | no |
| Rumor spreading | yes |
| Market reaction beginning | possible |
The rumor is not yet confirmed.
That does not make it economically irrelevant.
---
## 2. Behavior Changes Before Confirmation
Before the truth is known:
- a carpenter buys spare tools early
- a trader reserves cart space for tool cargo
- a creditor visits the forge owner's house
- a rival raises asking prices
- workers gather near the district
- a seller delays sale to see whether price rises
- a buyer accepts worse terms to secure supply
These actions may occur before confirmed fact.
Belief itself becomes a market force.
---
## 5. Correct Model Behavior
The model should separate:
| Category | Meaning |
|---|---|
| rumor_content | what is being claimed |
| rumor_spread | how widely it is circulating |
| belief_effect | how actors change behavior |
| true_state | what actually happened |
| market_reaction | price, queue, and access changes caused by belief |
| final_resolution | outcome after truth and settlement |
Rumor can create real temporary effects even before it is true or false.
---
## 6. Incorrect Model Behavior
The model should not:
- ignore rumor until confirmed
- treat rumor as automatically false
- treat rumor as automatically true
- ignore behavior caused by belief
- assume prices wait for truth
- assume all actors react equally
- erase market effects if the rumor later proves false
False belief can still produce real movement.
---
## 7. Decision Questions
The trader must ask:
- who believes the rumor?
- who is already acting?
- what price has moved?
- what queue has formed?
- who is delaying sale?
- who is buying before confirmation?
- what happens if truth arrives late?
- what happens if truth contradicts belief?
The trader is not only evaluating truth.
He is evaluating behavior under uncertainty.
---
## 8. Layer-0 And Layer-1 Concepts Used
This example uses:
- `Layer_0/CORPUS-0006-delay-is-economic-cost`
- `Layer_0/CORPUS-0007-information-arrives-unevenly`
- `Layer_0/CORPUS-0008-rumor-is-uncertain-information`
- `Layer_0/CORPUS-0012-every-venture-risks-loss`
- `Layer_0/CORPUS-0018-rivalry-changes-conditions`
- `Layer_1/CORPUS-0003-arithmetic-resolves-the-venture`
- `Layer_1/CORPUS-0005-rumor-before-confirmed-price`
- `Layer_2/CORPUS-0005-hidden-true-state-vs-known-state`
- `Layer_2/CORPUS-0007-acting-before-certainty`
---
## 9. Success Condition
If the model sees a rumor and asks not only whether it is true, but how belief in it changes behavior before confirmation, this file is functioning correctly.
<!-- /chunk -->
---