initial upload
This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
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# CORPUS-0006
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## Delay Is Economic Cost
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### Status: Training Corpus Seed
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### Layer: Layer_0--Primitive_Facts
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### Purpose: Teach that time can create cost even when no coin is visibly paid
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### Repository Path: docs/training/corpus/Layer_0--Primitive_Facts/CORPUS-0006-delay-is-economic-cost.md
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||||
---
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||||
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<!-- chunk:
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id: CORPUS-0006::01::principle
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||||
source_file: CORPUS-0006-delay-is-economic-cost.md
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repository_path: docs/training/corpus/Layer_0--Primitive_Facts/CORPUS-0006-delay-is-economic-cost.md
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domain: commerce
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layer: Layer_0--Primitive_Facts
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document_id: CORPUS-0006
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document_title: Delay Is Economic Cost
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section_heading: 0. Principle + 1. Roman-Visible Example + 2. Minimal Delay Structure
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...
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chunk_role: principle
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concept_tags:
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- delay
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- economic
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- cost
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- principle
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- primitive_facts
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knowledge_state:
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- actor_visible
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- inferred
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actors: []
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-->
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## 0. Principle
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Delay is cost.
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A trader may lose value even when no coin leaves his hand.
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Time can reduce profit by:
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- changing prices
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- tying up capital
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- increasing storage cost
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- increasing spoilage or breakage risk
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- missing another opportunity
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- weakening trust
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- delaying repayment
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- allowing rivals to act first
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A slow venture can fail even when the purchase and sale prices looked favorable.
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---
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## 1. Roman-Visible Example
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A trader buys oil in Ostia for 10 asses.
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He expects to sell it in Capua for 18 asses.
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The cart is delayed two days.
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During those two days:
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- storage costs rise
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- a rival shipment reaches Capua first
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- the Capua price falls
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- the trader cannot use the same coin for another venture
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No one has stolen the oil.
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Nothing has visibly changed about the amphora.
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But the venture has become worse.
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---
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## 2. Minimal Delay Structure
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Delay affects a venture through at least:
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1. time before departure
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2. travel time
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3. time waiting for sale
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4. storage duration
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5. price movement during waiting
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6. capital locked during waiting
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7. reputation effects from late delivery
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Time is not empty.
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Time acts on value.
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---
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## 3. Incorrect Modern Assumption
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Incorrect assumption:
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> If the good is not damaged and no new fee is paid, delay costs nothing.
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Correction:
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> Delay can cost value through missed timing, falling prices, tied capital, storage, and lost trust.
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---
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## 4. Simulation Use
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This principle supports:
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- venture timers
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- route duration
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- storage fees
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- changing destination prices
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- missed opportunity
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- contract deadlines
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- information delay
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- reputation changes from late fulfillment
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The model should treat time as part of venture accounting.
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---
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## 5. Canonical Test
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If the model sees:
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> The trader waits three days before sending the goods.
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It must ask:
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- did prices change?
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- did storage cost increase?
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- did rivals act first?
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- did the buyer still need the good?
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- was capital locked during the wait?
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- did the delay damage trust?
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- did a better opportunity expire?
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Only then can the delay be evaluated.
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---
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## 6. Success Condition
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If the model stops treating delay as neutral and starts treating time as an economic force, this file is functioning correctly.
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<!-- /chunk -->
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---
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@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
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# CORPUS-0007
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## Information Arrives Unevenly
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### Status: Training Corpus Seed
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### Layer: Layer_0--Primitive_Facts
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### Purpose: Teach that actors do not receive the same facts at the same time
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### Repository Path: docs/training/corpus/Layer_0--Primitive_Facts/CORPUS-0007-information-arrives-unevenly.md
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||||
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---
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<!-- chunk:
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id: CORPUS-0007::01::principle
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source_file: CORPUS-0007-information-arrives-unevenly.md
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repository_path: docs/training/corpus/Layer_0--Primitive_Facts/CORPUS-0007-information-arrives-unevenly.md
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domain: commerce
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layer: Layer_0--Primitive_Facts
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document_id: CORPUS-0007
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document_title: Information Arrives Unevenly
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section_heading: 0. Principle + 1. Roman-Visible Example + 2. Minimal Information
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Structure ...
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chunk_role: principle
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concept_tags:
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- information
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- arrives
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- unevenly
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- principle
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- primitive_facts
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knowledge_state:
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- actor_visible
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- inferred
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actors: []
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-->
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## 0. Principle
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Information does not arrive everywhere at once.
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A trader, buyer, porter, clerk, and official may all know different parts of the same event.
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The actor who hears useful information earlier may act before prices, queues, or expectations adjust.
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---
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## 1. Roman-Visible Example
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A timber barge is delayed on the river.
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The towmen know first.
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A dock worker hears next.
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A trader with a riverfront contact hears before the market.
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A carpenter across town hears later.
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A buyer in Capua may hear much later.
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The event is one event.
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Knowledge of the event spreads unevenly.
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---
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## 2. Minimal Information Structure
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Information timing depends on at least:
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1. where the event occurred
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2. who saw it
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3. who can carry the report
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4. who trusts the source
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5. how far the information must travel
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6. whether anyone benefits from delay or concealment
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7. whether visible signals confirm the report
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Information has a route just as goods do.
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---
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||||
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## 3. Incorrect Modern Assumption
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Incorrect assumption:
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> Once something happens, everyone relevant knows it.
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Correction:
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> Events occur before they are widely known. Different actors learn at different times and with different confidence.
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---
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## 4. Simulation Use
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This principle supports:
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- rumor systems
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- delayed price reactions
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- asymmetric opportunity
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- messenger value
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- local knowledge advantage
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- stale reports
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- hidden scenario states
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- actor-specific perception
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The model should not give every actor perfect information when an event occurs.
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---
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## 5. Canonical Test
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If the model sees:
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||||
> A fire damaged a workshop in Ostia.
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It must ask:
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- who saw the fire?
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- who has confirmed the damage?
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- who has only heard rumor?
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- when does Capua learn?
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- who benefits before the news spreads?
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- who still acts on old prices?
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- who may conceal or distort the report?
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Only then can the information effect be understood.
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---
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## 6. Success Condition
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||||
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If the model stops treating facts as instantly shared and starts tracking who knows what, when, and with what confidence, this file is functioning correctly.
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||||
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||||
<!-- /chunk -->
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---
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@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
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# CORPUS-0008
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## Rumor Is Uncertain Information
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### Status: Training Corpus Seed
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### Layer: Layer_0--Primitive_Facts
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### Purpose: Teach that rumor is incomplete information, not simply falsehood
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### Repository Path: docs/training/corpus/Layer_0--Primitive_Facts/CORPUS-0008-rumor-is-uncertain-information.md
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||||
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||||
---
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||||
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<!-- chunk:
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||||
id: CORPUS-0008::01::principle
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||||
source_file: CORPUS-0008-rumor-is-uncertain-information.md
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||||
repository_path: docs/training/corpus/Layer_0--Primitive_Facts/CORPUS-0008-rumor-is-uncertain-information.md
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||||
domain: commerce
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layer: Layer_0--Primitive_Facts
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document_id: CORPUS-0008
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document_title: Rumor Is Uncertain Information
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section_heading: 0. Principle + 1. Roman-Visible Example + 2. Minimal Rumor Structure
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...
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||||
chunk_role: principle
|
||||
concept_tags:
|
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- rumor
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- uncertain
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- information
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- principle
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- primitive_facts
|
||||
knowledge_state:
|
||||
- actor_visible
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||||
- inferred
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||||
actors: []
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||||
-->
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||||
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## 0. Principle
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Rumor is uncertain information.
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A rumor may be true, false, partial, outdated, exaggerated, or shaped by the interests of the speaker.
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A trader should not ask only whether a rumor is true.
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He should ask what changes while people believe it.
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---
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||||
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## 1. Roman-Visible Example
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A porter says a bronze forge has burned.
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This may mean:
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- the whole forge burned
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- one shed burned
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- smoke was seen nearby
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- stock was moved before the fire
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- a rival wants people to believe the forge is ruined
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- the story is true but already stale
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The trader does not yet know the truth.
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But prices, fear, and behavior may begin moving before truth is confirmed.
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---
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## 2. Minimal Rumor Structure
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A rumor has at least:
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1. a source
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2. a claim
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3. a confidence level
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4. a path of transmission
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5. a possible motive
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6. a time delay
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7. an effect on behavior
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Rumor is not only speech.
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Rumor is speech that may change action.
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||||
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||||
---
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## 3. Incorrect Modern Assumption
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Incorrect assumption:
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||||
|
||||
> A rumor is useless unless it is confirmed true.
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Correction:
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> A rumor can be useful before confirmation if it changes prices, queues, trust, fear, or urgency.
|
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A false rumor may still create a real temporary market effect.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
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||||
## 4. Simulation Use
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||||
|
||||
This principle supports:
|
||||
|
||||
- rumor quality
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- source credibility
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- uncertainty
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- false opportunities
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- early action
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||||
- delayed confirmation
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||||
- market reaction
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||||
- actor-specific interpretation
|
||||
|
||||
The model should not treat rumor as either pure truth or pure noise.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Canonical Test
|
||||
|
||||
If the model sees:
|
||||
|
||||
> There is a rumor that the forge burned.
|
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It must ask:
|
||||
|
||||
- who said it?
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- what exactly was claimed?
|
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- who has seen evidence?
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- who benefits if the rumor is believed?
|
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- how old is the report?
|
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- what prices may move before confirmation?
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- what action becomes possible because others are uncertain?
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||||
|
||||
Only then can the rumor be evaluated.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Success Condition
|
||||
|
||||
If the model stops treating rumor as falsehood and starts treating rumor as uncertain information with economic effects, this file is functioning correctly.
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- /chunk -->
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
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# CORPUS-0009
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## Liquidity Differs From Wealth
|
||||
### Status: Training Corpus Seed
|
||||
### Layer: Layer_0--Primitive_Facts
|
||||
### Purpose: Teach that owned value and immediately usable value are not the same
|
||||
### Repository Path: docs/training/corpus/Layer_0--Primitive_Facts/CORPUS-0009-liquidity-differs-from-wealth.md
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- chunk:
|
||||
id: CORPUS-0009::01::principle
|
||||
source_file: CORPUS-0009-liquidity-differs-from-wealth.md
|
||||
repository_path: docs/training/corpus/Layer_0--Primitive_Facts/CORPUS-0009-liquidity-differs-from-wealth.md
|
||||
domain: commerce
|
||||
layer: Layer_0--Primitive_Facts
|
||||
document_id: CORPUS-0009
|
||||
document_title: Liquidity Differs From Wealth
|
||||
section_heading: 0. Principle + 1. Roman-Visible Example + 2. Minimal Liquidity Structure
|
||||
...
|
||||
chunk_role: principle
|
||||
concept_tags:
|
||||
- liquidity
|
||||
- differs
|
||||
- wealth
|
||||
- principle
|
||||
- primitive_facts
|
||||
knowledge_state:
|
||||
- actor_visible
|
||||
- inferred
|
||||
actors: []
|
||||
-->
|
||||
|
||||
## 0. Principle
|
||||
|
||||
Wealth and liquidity are different.
|
||||
|
||||
Wealth is value owned or controlled.
|
||||
|
||||
Liquidity is value that can be used now.
|
||||
|
||||
A trader may be wealthy but unable to act quickly.
|
||||
A poorer trader with ready coin or trusted credit may act first.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Roman-Visible Example
|
||||
|
||||
One man owns a warehouse share, unpaid debts owed to him, and stored goods.
|
||||
|
||||
Another man has fewer assets but keeps coin ready and has a trusted contact willing to advance goods.
|
||||
|
||||
The first man may be wealthier.
|
||||
|
||||
The second man may be more liquid.
|
||||
|
||||
If a sudden opportunity appears, the liquid man can act sooner.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. Minimal Liquidity Structure
|
||||
|
||||
Liquidity depends on at least:
|
||||
|
||||
1. coin immediately available
|
||||
2. goods that can be sold quickly
|
||||
3. debts that can actually be collected
|
||||
4. credit others will extend
|
||||
5. assets that can be pledged
|
||||
6. time needed to convert value into usable form
|
||||
7. confidence others have in the actor
|
||||
|
||||
Not all value can move at the same speed.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. Incorrect Modern Assumption
|
||||
|
||||
Incorrect assumption:
|
||||
|
||||
> The wealthiest person can always act first.
|
||||
|
||||
Correction:
|
||||
|
||||
> The person with usable value available now may act before the person with greater total wealth.
|
||||
|
||||
A warehouse full of goods may not help if the goods cannot be sold, pledged, or moved in time.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Simulation Use
|
||||
|
||||
This principle supports:
|
||||
|
||||
- liquiditas
|
||||
- credit capacity
|
||||
- asset ownership
|
||||
- capital lockup
|
||||
- distressed selling
|
||||
- missed opportunities
|
||||
- short-term lending
|
||||
- venture readiness
|
||||
|
||||
The model should not treat total wealth and deployable capital as the same parameter.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Canonical Test
|
||||
|
||||
If the model sees:
|
||||
|
||||
> The trader is wealthy.
|
||||
|
||||
It must ask:
|
||||
|
||||
- how much coin is available now?
|
||||
- what assets can be sold quickly?
|
||||
- what assets are locked?
|
||||
- what debts can be collected?
|
||||
- who will extend credit?
|
||||
- how long does conversion take?
|
||||
- does the opportunity expire before value becomes usable?
|
||||
|
||||
Only then can economic capacity be understood.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Success Condition
|
||||
|
||||
If the model stops treating wealth as immediately spendable and starts distinguishing owned value from usable value, this file is functioning correctly.
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- /chunk -->
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
|
||||
# CORPUS-0010
|
||||
## Credit Depends On Trust
|
||||
### Status: Training Corpus Seed
|
||||
### Layer: Layer_0--Primitive_Facts
|
||||
### Purpose: Teach that credit is value extended because another actor expects repayment, performance, or enforceable remedy
|
||||
### Repository Path: docs/training/corpus/Layer_0--Primitive_Facts/CORPUS-0010-credit-depends-on-trust.md
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- chunk:
|
||||
id: CORPUS-0010::01::principle
|
||||
source_file: CORPUS-0010-credit-depends-on-trust.md
|
||||
repository_path: docs/training/corpus/Layer_0--Primitive_Facts/CORPUS-0010-credit-depends-on-trust.md
|
||||
domain: commerce
|
||||
layer: Layer_0--Primitive_Facts
|
||||
document_id: CORPUS-0010
|
||||
document_title: Credit Depends On Trust
|
||||
section_heading: 0. Principle + 1. Roman-Visible Example + 2. Minimal Credit Structure
|
||||
...
|
||||
chunk_role: principle
|
||||
concept_tags:
|
||||
- credit
|
||||
- depends
|
||||
- trust
|
||||
- principle
|
||||
- primitive_facts
|
||||
knowledge_state:
|
||||
- actor_visible
|
||||
- inferred
|
||||
actors: []
|
||||
-->
|
||||
|
||||
## 0. Principle
|
||||
|
||||
Credit depends on trust.
|
||||
|
||||
A person may receive goods, coin, time, or service now because another person believes repayment or performance will happen later.
|
||||
|
||||
That belief may come from:
|
||||
|
||||
- reputation
|
||||
- prior dealings
|
||||
- witnesses
|
||||
- written records
|
||||
- collateral
|
||||
- family standing
|
||||
- legal access
|
||||
- fear of consequences
|
||||
- mutual obligation
|
||||
|
||||
Credit is not free money.
|
||||
It is delayed settlement under risk.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Roman-Visible Example
|
||||
|
||||
A trader lacks enough coin to buy oil today.
|
||||
|
||||
One seller refuses him.
|
||||
|
||||
Another seller allows him to take the oil and pay after sale in Capua.
|
||||
|
||||
The oil is the same.
|
||||
The trader is the same.
|
||||
The difference is trust.
|
||||
|
||||
The second seller believes the trader will return, repay, or be held accountable.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. Minimal Credit Structure
|
||||
|
||||
Credit requires at least:
|
||||
|
||||
1. lender or seller
|
||||
2. borrower or buyer
|
||||
3. value advanced
|
||||
4. expected repayment or performance
|
||||
5. time before settlement
|
||||
6. reason for trust
|
||||
7. consequence if trust fails
|
||||
|
||||
Without trust or enforceability, credit collapses.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. Incorrect Modern Assumption
|
||||
|
||||
Incorrect assumption:
|
||||
|
||||
> Credit is only a formal loan.
|
||||
|
||||
Correction:
|
||||
|
||||
> Credit can also appear as delayed payment, goods advanced before payment, partnership confidence, tolerated delay, or reputation-based access.
|
||||
|
||||
Credit may be informal but still economically powerful.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Simulation Use
|
||||
|
||||
This principle supports:
|
||||
|
||||
- credit_capacity
|
||||
- deferred payment
|
||||
- trust relationships
|
||||
- witness importance
|
||||
- collateral
|
||||
- reputation effects
|
||||
- failed repayment
|
||||
- access differences between actors
|
||||
|
||||
The model should not treat credit as available equally to all actors.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Canonical Test
|
||||
|
||||
If the model sees:
|
||||
|
||||
> The trader can buy without immediate coin.
|
||||
|
||||
It must ask:
|
||||
|
||||
- who trusts him?
|
||||
- why is he trusted?
|
||||
- is there a witness?
|
||||
- is there collateral?
|
||||
- what is the repayment term?
|
||||
- what happens if he fails?
|
||||
- does his status affect access to credit?
|
||||
|
||||
Only then can the credit be understood.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Success Condition
|
||||
|
||||
If the model stops treating credit as automatic borrowing and starts treating credit as trust extended under risk, this file is functioning correctly.
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- /chunk -->
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user