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# CORPUS-0007
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## Information Arrives Unevenly
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### Status: Training Corpus Seed
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### Layer: Layer_0--Primitive_Facts
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### Purpose: Teach that actors do not receive the same facts at the same time
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### Repository Path: docs/training/corpus/Layer_0--Primitive_Facts/CORPUS-0007-information-arrives-unevenly.md
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---
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## 0. Principle
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Information does not arrive everywhere at once.
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A trader, buyer, porter, clerk, and official may all know different parts of the same event.
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The actor who hears useful information earlier may act before prices, queues, or expectations adjust.
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---
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## 1. Roman-Visible Example
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A timber barge is delayed on the river.
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The towmen know first.
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A dock worker hears next.
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A trader with a riverfront contact hears before the market.
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A carpenter across town hears later.
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A buyer in Capua may hear much later.
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The event is one event.
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Knowledge of the event spreads unevenly.
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---
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## 2. Minimal Information Structure
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Information timing depends on at least:
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1. where the event occurred
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2. who saw it
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3. who can carry the report
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4. who trusts the source
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5. how far the information must travel
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6. whether anyone benefits from delay or concealment
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7. whether visible signals confirm the report
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Information has a route just as goods do.
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---
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## 3. Incorrect Modern Assumption
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Incorrect assumption:
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> Once something happens, everyone relevant knows it.
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Correction:
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> Events occur before they are widely known. Different actors learn at different times and with different confidence.
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---
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## 4. Simulation Use
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This principle supports:
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- rumor systems
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- delayed price reactions
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- asymmetric opportunity
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- messenger value
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- local knowledge advantage
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- stale reports
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- hidden scenario states
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- actor-specific perception
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The model should not give every actor perfect information when an event occurs.
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---
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## 5. Canonical Test
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If the model sees:
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> A fire damaged a workshop in Ostia.
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It must ask:
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- who saw the fire?
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- who has confirmed the damage?
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- who has only heard rumor?
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- when does Capua learn?
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- who benefits before the news spreads?
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- who still acts on old prices?
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- who may conceal or distort the report?
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Only then can the information effect be understood.
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---
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## 6. Success Condition
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If the model stops treating facts as instantly shared and starts tracking who knows what, when, and with what confidence, this file is functioning correctly.
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