78 lines
5.3 KiB
Markdown
78 lines
5.3 KiB
Markdown
Here’s a **CIVICVS-style draft** you can drop into your workspace. I’ve kept it lean and transcript-ready.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
# Civic Analysis (Draft): Missouri’s District-by-District Supermajority for Citizen Initiatives
|
||
|
||
## Source
|
||
|
||
Lara Bonatesta. *“Missouri voters to decide on 2026 measure to create a first-of-its-kind citizen initiative supermajority requirement.”*
|
||
**Ballotpedia, Daily Brew**, 18 September 2025.
|
||
[https://info.ballotpedia.org/dm?id=34D56BF65BDE86C99102C4F577E443A96E43630501AD63A4](https://info.ballotpedia.org/dm?id=34D56BF65BDE86C99102C4F577E443A96E43630501AD63A4)
|
||
(Local copy preserved as `DailyBrew__Missouri_Supermajority_2026.pdf`).
|
||
*Accessed 18 September 2025, 11:15 AM (CDT).*
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Claim in the Record
|
||
|
||
Missouri will place on the **Nov. 3, 2026** ballot a constitutional amendment that replaces a single statewide majority with a requirement that **citizen-initiated constitutional amendments win a simple majority in *each* congressional district (8 of 8)**—a *first-of-its-kind* rule in the U.S. .
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Record Snapshot (salient facts)
|
||
|
||
* **Novelty:** Eleven states use supermajority thresholds for some ballot measures, but **none** require approval in **each congressional district** .
|
||
* **Current map context:** Missouri has **6 Republican** and **2 Democratic** U.S. House districts; all eight were won by double digits in 2024 .
|
||
* **Legislative path:** HJR 3 passed the House **98–58** (98 R yes; 52 D + 6 R no) and the Senate **21–11** (21 R yes; 9 D + 2 R no) .
|
||
* **Stated justifications:** Proponents frame it as ensuring “broad consensus” across equally populated districts; opponents argue it **dilutes citizen power** and imposes a stricter standard on citizen initiatives than on legislature-referred measures .
|
||
* **Bundled provisions:** Adds a constitutional ban on foreign national contributions — this would constitutionalize a state-level prohibition for ballot-measure campaigns, which federal law does not clearly cover; many states have enacted similar bans, and some are under active litigation (e.g., Maine).
|
||
* **Another moving part:** The General Assembly approved **new congressional district boundaries** this month, relevant because the proposal hardwires district consent into the initiative process .
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Method View (what this measure *does*, civically)
|
||
|
||
**Unit of consent** is shifted from **one statewide electorate** to **eight separate district electorates**. A simple statewide majority can be **nullified** by failing to win a majority in any single district. This is not a mere threshold increase; it is a **structural veto** inserted at the district level.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Civic Effects (testable, record-based)
|
||
|
||
1. **Minority Veto via Map Structure**
|
||
Given a stable 6–2 district alignment, a statewide majority could be blocked by failing to carry all eight districts—even when overall votes favor passage. The veto power **tracks district lines**, not aggregate consent .
|
||
|
||
2. **Asymmetry Between Citizens and Legislature**
|
||
Opponents note the stricter standard applies to **citizen-initiated** constitutional amendments but not to measures placed by the **legislature**, creating an institutional preference against direct democracy .
|
||
|
||
3. **Constitutionalizing Procedure**
|
||
Bundled items (foreign money ban, hearings, full text with ballots) move procedural controls from statute to **constitutional** status, raising the cost of later reform—even for benign administrative tweaks .
|
||
|
||
4. **Sensitivity to Redistricting**
|
||
Because district majorities become dispositive, **district boundaries** (and their partisan geography) gain outsized influence over the initiative process. The article notes new maps were just approved, which heightens this sensitivity .
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Arguments in the Record (verbatim direction, summarized)
|
||
|
||
* **Proponents:** District majorities ensure “broad consensus” across equally populated districts—fairness by geography and population parity .
|
||
* **Opponents:** It **dilutes citizen votes** and applies unequal standards to citizen vs. legislature-initiated measures—removing power from people and insulating lawmakers’ preferred route .
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## CIVICVS Reading (civic consequence)
|
||
|
||
The complexity here is functional: by **redefining consent**, the rule makes success contingent on **map-distributed** approval rather than **statewide** approval. In practical terms, it **narrows** the future capacity of citizens to amend their constitution and **elevates** district line-drawing as a gatekeeper to constitutional change. The record supports classifying this as **structural manipulation cloaked in consensus language**—a predictable effect traceable to the current 6–2 district reality and the newly approved boundaries .
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Predictions (falsifiable)
|
||
|
||
* Measures that poll **>55% statewide** but are **ideologically uneven** across districts will **fail** more often than under current rules.
|
||
* Pass likelihood will correlate more tightly with **district partisan distribution** than with **statewide median voter** preferences.
|
||
* Post-2026, there will be a measurable **drop** in the number of successful **citizen-initiated constitutional amendments** relative to pre-change baselines (controlling for topic mix).
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
If you want, I can now append a **short “Record Table”** (votes, map split, bundled provisions) to this draft for quick reference, or keep it exactly as-is.
|