81 lines
5.2 KiB
Markdown
81 lines
5.2 KiB
Markdown
# CIVICVS Final Report
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**Subject:** Missouri’s proposed 2026 district-by-district majority rule for citizen-initiated constitutional amendments
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**Method note:** This Report presents conclusions; the full working (Claim → LLM → Context → LLM → Civic Consequence) is preserved in the **Appendix** (our complete dialogue). This aligns with CIVICVS practice: conclusions stand on the record; reasoning is transparently auditable in the transcript.
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---
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## Executive Summary
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Missouri has placed on the November 3, 2026 ballot a constitutional amendment that would require **citizen-initiated constitutional amendments** to win a **simple majority in each of the state’s eight congressional districts**—a **first-of-its-kind** requirement in the U.S. The measure also **bundles** several procedural provisions into the constitution (e.g., a ban on foreign-national contributions to ballot-measure campaigns, signature-fraud criminalization, mandatory public hearings, and ballot distribution of full text).
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**Conclusions (record-based):**
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1. **Complexity increases materially.** Passage conditions multiply from **one** statewide threshold to **eight** concurrent district thresholds, and procedural controls are constitutionalized rather than left to statute.
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2. **Citizen-initiated change is entrenched.** Any **citizen-initiated repeal** would itself need majorities in **all eight districts**. Legislative referral may follow different standards, creating an institutional asymmetry.
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These outcomes narrow citizen power and raise the bar for future change by citizens, while increasing sensitivity to whatever congressional map is in force.
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---
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## Record Snapshot (salient, verifiable)
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* **Novel design:** No other state requires district-by-district voter approval for initiatives; several do use percentage supermajorities, but not this geographic pass condition.
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* **What the amendment does:** Shifts unit of consent from one statewide electorate to **eight district electorates**; adds bundled provisions to the **constitution** (some already appear in statute).
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* **Legislative path:** HJR 3 passed the House **98–58** and the Senate **21–11**; recorded partisan splits are included in the source.
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* **Timing and ballot:** The measure is slated for the **Nov. 3, 2026** ballot among four statewide measures.
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* **Arguments quoted in the record:**
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* Proponents: district majorities reflect “broad consensus” across equally populated districts.
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* Opponents: applies stricter standards to citizen initiatives than to legislature-referred measures; “dilutes” citizen power.
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* **Map sensitivity:** New congressional boundaries were approved this month—relevant because district lines become dispositive under the rule.
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---
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## Findings
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### 1) Complexity (validated)
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* **Mechanism:** Success condition expands from **one** statewide majority to **eight** simultaneous district majorities—**unique** nationally.
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* **Procedural surface:** Bundled items are moved into the **constitution**, increasing the amount of higher-law text governing initiatives (and raising the cost of later administrative refinement).
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**Finding:** The amendment increases rule complexity on its face.
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### 2) Entrenchment against citizen-initiated repeal (validated)
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* **Self-application:** The new rule governs **all citizen-initiated amendments**; therefore, a citizen-initiated **repeal** must also clear **all eight districts**.
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* **Asymmetry noted in record:** The article records objections that the stricter standard is **not** applied to legislature-referred measures, implying a different path may exist for legislative repeal.
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**Finding:** The amendment functions as a **constitutional ratchet** on citizen-initiated change.
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---
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## Civic Consequences
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* **Narrowed citizen power:** Additional decision nodes (8-of-8 test) allow district geography—rather than statewide aggregate consent—to defeat citizen proposals.
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* **Locked procedures:** Constitutionalizing procedural controls reduces flexibility and elevates minor process adjustments to constitutional change processes.
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* **Map gatekeeping:** Because consent is keyed to districts, the **current map** effectively becomes a gatekeeper to constitutional change until replaced.
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---
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## Verification Plan (post-election)
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Upon certification of results after **November 5**, re-open the record and:
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1. Compare pass/fail patterns against the **8-of-8** condition;
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2. Document any reliance on the bundled constitutional provisions during the campaign or litigation;
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3. Note whether repeal pathways proposed (if any) are **citizen-initiated** or **legislature-referred**.
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---
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## Source
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Lara Bonatesta. *“Missouri voters to decide on 2026 measure to create a first-of-its-kind citizen initiative supermajority requirement.”*
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**Ballotpedia, Daily Brew**, 18 September 2025.
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[https://info.ballotpedia.org/dm?id=34D56BF65BDE86C99102C4F577E443A96E43630501AD63A4](https://info.ballotpedia.org/dm?id=34D56BF65BDE86C99102C4F577E443A96E43630501AD63A4)
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(Local copy preserved as `DailyBrew__Missouri_Supermajority_2026.pdf`).
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*Accessed 18 September 2025, 11:15 AM (CDT).*
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---
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**Appendix:** Full dialogue (Claim → LLM → Context → LLM → Civic Consequence), to be published alongside the Report as the auditable transcript.
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