External review of bac6120 by the Kane Fabric project found two defects, both
mine, both cheap now and expensive once anything implements against them.
The contract gave kane-fabric/oidc as an example authentication method. That
named a capability in another project which has no OIDC service, no user
database and no person-authentication role at all. An example in an interface
document is read as an expectation by the next person to implement it -- the
same failure as "acceptable for a development name", a plausible clause nobody
challenged hardening into a constraint. Method is now specified by shape rather
than by example, and the document names no system outside itself.
The headers were X-Kane-Auth-Email and X-Kane-Auth-Method. Two things wrong: a
jurisdiction in a header name is a deployment fact in an invariant place, in a
document that spends a section insisting the compiler must never learn a
deployment's membership concepts; and -Email named a format in a field the
contract explicitly allows to hold something else. Now X-Mechcomp-Auth-Id and
X-Mechcomp-Auth-Method. The receiver is the invariant, the jurisdiction is not.
Section 3 now says plainly that the identifier need not be an email address. An
opaque or epoch-scoped token fits Author.email without a schema change; the
field is named for what this deployment holds, not for what the contract
requires. Renaming it would be a format change to every stored record and is
deliberately not done.
Two new invariants, both from taking seriously that containers owned by other
projects will insert themselves into this chain.
I-1: exactly one hop decides, and it is the last before the application. Two
intermediaries both setting the identity headers is a forgery vector wearing
the costume of a deployment change -- the later wins, the earlier believes it
decided, nothing reports the conflict. CT 101 is named in section 2 because it
is what exists, not because it is the invariant.
I-4: anything that is not an affirmative permission is a refusal. Unreachable,
timed out, malformed and 5xx all deny. Fail-open and fail-closed are both
defensible and are not the same system; finding out which one was built during
an outage is the worst way to learn it.
Section 6 gains parcels and delivery points explicitly, so the boundary holds
whichever primitive the geography layer settles on. Section 7 no longer obliges
any named project to provide anything -- the authorisation decision belongs to
a membership system between geography and this application, and nothing here
asks a geography layer to become an identity provider.