194 lines
8.3 KiB
Markdown
194 lines
8.3 KiB
Markdown
# DESCENSUS — Addendum 1
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## Cost Structure and Exploit Closure
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### Status: Canonical. Do not alter without project owner instruction.
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### Date: 2026-05-02
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### Extends: docs/DESCENSUS-genesis.md
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---
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## Purpose of This Addendum
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The genesis document establishes what DESCENSUS is and how the epoch
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filter operates. This addendum closes the exploit loops that code
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cannot close alone. Each principle here describes a cost structure
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that is not enforced by rules — it is enforced by the honest operation
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of the simulation's physical and social reality.
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Where code fails to implement these principles completely, this document
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is the authority. Implementation catches up to the document, not the
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reverse.
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---
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## Principle 1 — Distance Is Elapsed Time
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Movement between locations costs simulation days. Those days cannot be
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recovered, compressed, or prepaid. There is no fast travel. There is no
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preparation that eliminates the cost of distance.
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A participant who identifies an attack target must travel to reach it.
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That travel consumes elapsed simulation days — days not spent producing,
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building relationships, or developing the clan. The cost is paid before
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the outcome is known.
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A participant who wishes to return must travel again. The distance does
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not decrease because the route is now known. Familiarity reduces
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uncertainty, not cost.
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**Exploit closed:** A participant cannot accumulate strength and then
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deploy it instantly across distance. Every application of force requires
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elapsed time proportional to distance. The cost of projection is built
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into the geometry of the world.
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---
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## Principle 2 — Intelligence Decays
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Knowledge of another participant's state is accurate at the moment of
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acquisition. It begins aging immediately.
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A participant who reaches a target location learns what is there at that
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moment. By the time they return — having paid the travel cost twice —
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the target's state has changed. The intelligence paid for in elapsed
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time is now historical. The participant acts on a record, not a current
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reading.
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The longer the return journey, the more the intelligence has aged.
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A distant target that required thirty simulated days to reach has
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changed for thirty simulated days by the time the attacker returns.
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**Exploit closed:** A participant cannot acquire perfect intelligence
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and act on it without cost. The act of acquiring intelligence consumes
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the time during which the intelligence remains current. Planning and
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execution cannot be separated from the cost of the interval between them.
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---
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## Principle 3 — Temporal State Resolution at Minimum Elapsed Time
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When two participants occupy the same H3 cell, the encounter is resolved
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at the minimum elapsed simulation time of the two participants.
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A participant at day 100 who encounters a participant at day 10 does not
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bring their day-100 strength to the encounter. The encounter resolves at
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day 10. The stronger participant's state is evaluated as it was at their
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own day-10 equivalent — including losses, weaknesses, and resource
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constraints that existed at that point in their history.
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The elapsed simulation time of each participant is not visible to others.
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It is not a number on a display. It is inferred from observable signals:
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camp size, tool quality, apparent health of clansmen, the wear on
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structures, the size of food stores. A participant who reads these
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signals carefully can estimate depth. They cannot know it.
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The elapsed time of any participant is also in flux. A participant who
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has been active for 100 days but suffered significant losses at day 60
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does not present as a day-100 participant. They present as whatever
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their current state reflects — which may be weaker than a participant
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at day 40 who suffered no losses.
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**Exploit closed:** A participant cannot prepare at depth and deploy
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that preparation against a shallower participant. The encounter resolves
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honestly at the point of contact, not at the point of planning.
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Stockpiling Mesolithic weapons for a future DESCENSUS encounter is
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evaluated at the elapsed time of the encounter, not at the elapsed time
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of the stockpile.
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---
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## Principle 4 — Aggression Is Self-Limiting
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A successful attack produces bounded loot, reduced defence, reduced
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production, and reduced reputation for the attacker.
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**Loot is bounded.** The target has what the epoch permits and what
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their elapsed simulation time has produced. There is no surplus beyond
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what exists. The attacker cannot extract more than was there.
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**Attrition compounds asymmetrically.** The target loses defence and
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production capacity. The attacker loses elapsed time, potential clan
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losses, and reputation. The attacker's cost is paid regardless of
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outcome. The target's loss is recoverable over subsequent elapsed days.
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Repeated aggression against the same target yields diminishing returns
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as the target's loot base depletes and the attacker's reputation
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deteriorates.
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**Reputation is a social parameter with real consequences.** In
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Mesolithic social reality, reputation is not an abstract score. It is
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the substrate of alliance, trade, mate exchange, and mutual defence.
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A participant recognised as a marauder by other participants loses
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access to the cooperative structures that make large clans viable.
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Food sharing, territorial agreements, knowledge exchange — all of
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these require a reputation that aggression erodes.
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The simulation does not punish aggression by decree. It allows
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Mesolithic social mechanics to operate honestly. A marauder clan
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reaches a natural ceiling imposed by isolation, travel cost, and
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the carrying capacity of territory it must hold alone.
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**Exploit closed:** There is no dominant strategy built on aggression.
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Every gain from aggression is offset by costs that compound over elapsed
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time. A participant who attempts to optimise for domination will find
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that domination is self-limiting before it becomes simulation-breaking.
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---
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## Principle 5 — Abandoned Settlements Are Finite
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When a participant quits the simulation, their settlement enters a
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static state. It does not grow, defend itself, or replenish.
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A static settlement can be reached, observed, and raided. Its loot
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is finite and does not regenerate. After extraction it is an empty
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location. There are no defenders to defeat and no future production
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to anticipate. It is the least interesting thing a participant can
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engage with.
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The simulation does not prevent interaction with abandoned settlements.
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It simply makes them structurally uninteresting as a sustained strategy.
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**Exploit closed:** Targeting abandoned settlements is not prohibited.
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It is simply not productive beyond the single extraction event. A
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participant who builds their strategy around abandoned settlements
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is building on a depleting resource base with no renewal.
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---
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## Principle 6 — The Simulation Does Not Prohibit. It Costs.
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There are no forbidden actions in the Simulator. There are only actions
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whose costs, when honestly calculated, make them self-limiting.
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This principle supersedes all game-design instincts to add rules,
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restrictions, cooldowns, or penalties. Before any restriction is
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proposed, the question must be asked: does the honest cost structure
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already make this action self-limiting? If yes, no rule is needed.
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If no, the cost structure is incomplete and must be corrected before
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a rule is added.
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A rule that overrides the cost structure is a design failure. It means
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the simulation is not honest about what the action costs. Fix the cost,
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not the rule.
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**This principle applies to all future addenda.** Each addendum closes
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a loop by identifying the honest cost that code failed to implement —
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not by adding a prohibition.
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---
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## What This Addendum Does Not Cover
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- The specific mechanics of DESCENSUS epoch transition (see genesis document)
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- The Roman epoch cost structure (to be addressed in a future addendum)
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- The Model's role in encounter resolution (to be addressed separately)
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- Multi-participant alliance mechanics (to be addressed in a future addendum)
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- The compression algorithm and its relationship to elapsed time
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(covered in OTIVM-IV design documentation)
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---
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*DESCENSUS — Addendum 1 — 2026-05-02*
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*TheRON — single contributor. AI assistants implement, document, flag — do not direct.*
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*Each addendum closes one loop. Addenda accumulate. None supersedes the genesis document.*
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*Where this document and code conflict, this document is the authority.*
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